Difference-in-Differences

PP5001 · Week 8 · Martinmas 2026

Professor David A. Jaeger

The Evaluation Problem

A policy begins at a particular time in a particular place. We observe outcomes before and after its introduction.

The before–after change combines:

  • The effect of the policy.
  • The change that would have occurred even without the policy.

We need a comparison that tells us about that second component.

Before and After

Before–after comparison from the original lecture slides.

The Basic DiD Idea

Use the change in the control group to estimate the change the treated group would have experienced without treatment.

\widehat\delta_{DiD}= \left(\bar Y_{T,post}-\bar Y_{T,pre}\right) -\left(\bar Y_{C,post}-\bar Y_{C,pre}\right).

Taking each group’s change removes its fixed level. Subtracting the control group’s change removes the common change over time.

The 2×2 Parameterization

Group Before After Change
Treatment \alpha+\gamma \alpha+\gamma+\tau+\delta \tau+\delta
Control \alpha \alpha+\tau \tau
Treatment minus control \gamma \gamma+\delta \delta

\alpha: control-group baseline. \gamma: initial group difference.

\tau: common time change. \delta: the additional change in the treated group.

The Parameters in the Graph

DiD parameterization from the original lecture slides.

Regression Representation

Let T_i=1 identify membership in the treatment group and Post_t=1 identify the post-policy period.

Y_{it}=\alpha+\gamma T_i+\tau Post_t +\delta\left(T_i\times Post_t\right)+u_{it}.

  • T_i allows the groups to have different initial levels.
  • Post_t allows for the common time change.
  • T_i\times Post_t equals one only for treated observations after the policy.

Why the Interaction Coefficient Is DiD

With an intercept and these three indicators, OLS fits all four cell means:

\begin{aligned} \hat\alpha&=\bar Y_{C,pre},\\ \hat\gamma&=\bar Y_{T,pre}-\bar Y_{C,pre},\\ \hat\tau&=\bar Y_{C,post}-\bar Y_{C,pre},\\ \hat\delta&=\bar Y_{T,post}-\hat\alpha-\hat\gamma-\hat\tau. \end{aligned}

Substituting the first three expressions into the last gives the difference-in-differences estimator.

Potential Outcomes and the ATT

Let Y_{it}^1 and Y_{it}^0 denote outcomes with and without treatment.

The effect of interest is

ATT=E\left[Y_{i,post}^1-Y_{i,post}^0\mid T_i=1\right].

We observe Y_{i,post}^1 for the treatment group. Its mean untreated outcome after the policy is the missing counterfactual.

Assume no anticipation and no spillovers to the control group.

Constructing the Counterfactual

Parallel trends implies

\begin{aligned} E\left[Y_{i,post}^0\mid T_i=1\right] ={}&E\left[Y_{i,pre}^0\mid T_i=1\right]\\ &+E\left[Y_{i,post}^0-Y_{i,pre}^0\mid T_i=0\right]. \end{aligned}

Treated group’s baseline + control group’s change = treated group’s counterfactual post-policy mean.

From the Counterfactual to the Effect

Substitute that counterfactual into the definition of the ATT:

\begin{aligned} ATT={}&E\left[Y_{i,post}\mid T_i=1\right] -E\left[Y_{i,pre}\mid T_i=1\right]\\ &-\left(E\left[Y_{i,post}\mid T_i=0\right] -E\left[Y_{i,pre}\mid T_i=0\right]\right). \end{aligned}

Use the analogy principle to replace the four population conditional means with their sample counterparts.

Card and Krueger: Policy, Data, and Identification

For discussion: What changed in New Jersey? Who was surveyed, when, and why is eastern Pennsylvania a plausible control group? State the identifying assumption in this setting.

Card and Krueger: Figure 1

Card and Krueger Figure 1, starting wages before and after the minimum-wage increase.

Card and Krueger (1994), Figure 1.

Card and Krueger: Table 3

Card and Krueger Table 3, average employment before and after.

For discussion: Explain columns (i)–(iii), including the DiD. Why do rows 3 and 4 differ? What is a full-time-equivalent employee?

Covariates in the Levels Model

Let X_{ik} be pre-treatment characteristics held fixed across the two periods.

\begin{aligned} Y_{it}={}&\alpha+\gamma T_i+\tau Post_t +\delta\left(T_i\times Post_t\right)\\ &+\sum_{k=1}^{K}\beta_k X_{ik} +\sum_{k=1}^{K}\theta_k\left(X_{ik}\times Post_t\right)+u_{it}. \end{aligned}

  • \beta_k allows baseline outcomes to differ with X_{ik}.
  • \theta_k allows the change over time to differ with X_{ik}.
  • \delta is the additional change associated with treatment, conditional on these characteristics.

From Levels to Differences with Covariates

For the same unit, subtract the pre-period equation from the post-period equation:

\Delta Y_i=\tau+\delta T_i +\sum_{k=1}^{K}\theta_k X_{ik}+\Delta u_i.

  • \alpha, \gamma T_i, and \sum_{k=1}^{K}\beta_kX_{ik} cancel.
  • \tau, \delta, and \theta_k retain exactly the same meanings.
  • Card–Krueger Table 4 uses employment changes as the outcome, with chain and ownership indicators entered directly as controls.

Card and Krueger: Table 4

Card and Krueger Table 4, regressions for the employment change.

For discussion: Compare columns (i) and (ii). Why might chain and ownership matter? Separate the change in sample from the effect of adding controls.

Currie and Walker: The Policy

Electronic toll collection illustration from the original lecture materials.

E-ZPass allows electronic toll collection, reducing stops and queues at toll plazas. The study asks whether the resulting changes improve infant health nearby.

Currie and Walker: Data and Identification

For discussion: Define the treatment and control groups, the timing of treatment, and the birth outcomes. Why compare mothers near the same road network? State parallel trends for this design.

Where Are the Comparisons Made?

Currie and Walker map of toll plazas and major roads.

Currie and Walker (2011), Figure 1.

Currie and Walker: Table 3

Currie and Walker Table 3, infant-health outcomes.

For discussion: Interpret the prematurity and low-birth-weight estimates in Panel 1. Distinguish percentage points from percentages. How do the estimates change when maternal characteristics are included?

Currie and Walker: Table 2

Currie and Walker Table 2, maternal characteristics.

For discussion: Could changes in who lives near toll plazas explain the health results? What does this table tell us, and what uncertainty remains?

Currie and Walker: Table 7

Currie and Walker Table 7, effects on air pollution.

For discussion: Compare the two pollutants. How does this evidence support the proposed mechanism? What does having only one monitor near a toll plaza imply?

What Can Threaten the Comparison?

  • Different underlying trends: a local shock changes the treated group’s outcome independently of the policy.
  • Anticipation: behaviour changes before the designated treatment date.
  • Spillovers: the policy affects the control group.
  • Composition: the people or establishments observed change over time.

Uncertainty and the Level of Treatment

Many individuals can share the same policy and the same shocks.

  • Restaurants share state-level economic conditions.
  • Repeated observations on a restaurant can have correlated disturbances.
  • Daily observations at a monitor can share persistent local conditions.

The number of observations is different from the number of independent policy comparisons.

Changes as the Dependent Variable

With the same units observed twice, subtract each unit’s pre-period equation from its post-period equation:

\Delta Y_i=\tau+\delta T_i+\Delta u_i.

The intercept is the control group’s average change. The coefficient on T_i is the difference between the groups’ changes.

What a Credible DiD Design Needs

  1. Clear policy timing and a well-defined outcome.
  2. A plausible comparison group and an explicit parallel-trends argument.
  3. Evidence on other changes, anticipation, spillovers, and composition.
  4. Uncertainty appropriate to the available independent comparisons.

The control group supplies the change used to construct the treated group’s counterfactual.

References

Card, D., and A. B. Krueger (1994). Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. American Economic Review, 84(4), 772–793.

Currie, J., and R. Walker (2011). Traffic Congestion and Infant Health: Evidence from E-ZPass. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(1), 65–90.